We investigate the dynamics of two-strategy replicator equations in which competition between strategies is delayed by a given time interval T . Taking T as a bifurcation parameter, we demonstrate the existence of (non-degenerate) Hopf bifurcations in these systems, and present an analysis of the resulting limit cycles using Lindstedt's method.
INTRODUCTION
The field of evolutionary dynamics uses both game theory and differential equations to model population shifts among competing adaptive strategies. One standard approach [1, 2] uses the replicator equation, which modifies the exponential model of population growth,
where ξ i is the population of strategy i and g i (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ) is the fitness of that strategy. The replicator equation [3] results from equation (1) by changing variables from the populations ξ i to the relative abundances, defined as x i ≡ ξ i /p where p is the total population:
(2) * Address all correspondence to this author.
We see thatṗ
where φ ≡ ∑ i x i g i is the average fitness of the whole population. By the product rule,ẋ 
So, using the fact that
equation (10) reduces to the identity
The fitness of a strategy is assumed to depend only on the relative abundance of each strategy in the overall population, since the model only seeks to capture the effect of competition between strategies, not any environmental or other factors. Therefore, we assume that g i has the form
Under this assumption, equation (8) is the replicator equation,
where φ is now expressed entirely in terms of the x i , as
Mathematically, φ is a coupling term that introduces dependence on the abundance and fitness of other strategies. The game-theoretic component of the replicator model lies in the choice of fitness functions. Take the payoff matrix A = (a i j ), where a i j is the expected reward for strategy i when it competes with strategy j. Then the fitness f i is the total expected payoff of strategy i vs. all strategies, weighted by their frequency:
where
In this work, we generalize the replicator model to systems in which competition with other strategies is delayed by a given time interval T , but competition between same-strategy players is not delayed. Then at time t, the available opponents for a strategy i player are x i (t) of her compatriots, and x j (t − T ) time-delayed players of each strategy j = i. If we writex i ≡ x i (t − T ) and definex
then the total expected payoff -i.e. the fitness -for strategy i is given by
The use of delayed fitness functions makes the replicator equation into the delay differential equation (DDE)
As a system of ODEs, the standard replicator equation is an (n−1) -dimensional problem, since n−1 of the x i are required to specify a point in phase space. The delayed replicator equation, by contrast, is an infinite-dimensional problem [4] whose solution is a flow on the space of functions on the interval [−T, 0).
For a concrete interpretation of this system, imagine a situation in which the different strategies are geographically separated, so each group has a delayed estimate of the other groups' populations. Each group sets its rate of reproduction based on the most current population data available: up-to-date for its own population and delayed by a fixed time T for all the others.
This system may also be considered as a model for playing games by mail, with asynchronous score-updating for each group; or of competition between species with a fixed gestation time.
DERIVATION
We analyze delayed evolutionary games with two strategies. For ease of notation, write (x 1 , x 2 ) = (x, y), and let
Thenẋ
which means
Substituting in these values, and writing y = 1 − x, the system is reduced to the single delay differential equatioṅ
At this point, we note that the four payoff parameters appear in only three independent groupings. So, we replace the four parameters a, b, c, d with q, r, s, defined by
Then equation (26) becomeṡ
ANALYSIS
The equilibrium points of equation (30) satisfyẋ = 0 and x = x. There are three equilibria:
The first two are the endpoints of the interval of physical relevance, since we require that x ∈ [0, 1]. The third lies in the interval (0, 1) if and only if |s| < |q + r| and s(q + r) < 0.
We examine the stability of the three points. Taylor expanding about x = 0 and x = 1, respectively, we obtain the linearized systemṡ
These two linearizations do not depend onx, so the stability of the endpoints depends only on the payoff coefficients and not on the delay. If the inequalities (32) hold, then the coefficients s and −(q + r + s) have the same sign, so the two endpoints have the same stability. If s > 0 and the inequalities (32) hold, we find that both endpoints are unstable; if s < 0 and the inequalities hold, then both endpoints are stable. Now consider the third equilibrium. Assume that it lies in the interval (0, 1); that is, inequalities (32) hold. To determine its stability, we set
In terms of z, equation (30) iṡ
We linearize about z = 0 to geṫ
First, note that if delay T = 0, the linearization reduces tȯ
Recall that the inequalities (32), which we are assuming are true, imply that the sign of s is opposite the sign of (q + r) and (q + r + s). Therefore, if s > 0, we find that the point z = 0 is stable; if s < 0, then it is unstable. In general, however, the linearization (37) has a non-zeroz term, so it is reasonable to expect that the stability will depend on the delay T . Given that, we analyze the system for a Hopf bifurcation, taking T as the bifurcation parameter.
Set z(t) = e λt (andz = e λ (t−T ) ) in equation (37) to obtain the characteristic equation
At the critical value of delay for a Hopf bifurcation, the eigenvalues are pure imaginary, so we take T = T cr and λ = iω. Substituting this into the characteristic equation and taking the real and imaginary parts, we obtain cos ωT cr = − q r
sin ωT cr = − (q + r) 2 rs(q + r + s) ω.
Squaring these equations and adding them, we can solve for the critical frequency ω:
It can be shown that the frequency is real and non-zero if and only if (in addition to (32))
Thus (43) is a necessary condition for a Hopf bifurcation to exist. We will assume that this is the case. Then, substituting the value of ω back into (40), we obtain the critical delay T cr :
This result agrees with the values of T cr and ω given by Rand and Verdugo [5] . We also apply the results of [5] to obtain an approximation for the amplitude of the limit cycle generated by the Hopf bifurcation. (See Appendix A.) If T = T cr + µ, the amplitude R is given by
Since R is real, µ must have the same sign as P/Q. This determines whether the Hopf bifurcation is sub-or supercritical. In particular, if the point z = 0 is stable for delay T < T cr and µ > 0, then the limit cycle is stable and the bifurcation is supercritical. We will treat an example of this type in the next section.
EXAMPLE: HAWK-DOVE GAMES
As an example, consider the hawk-dove system described by Nowak [6] . There are two strategies competing for a resource with benefit b: "hawks," who will escalate fights against other players, and "doves," who will retreat from fights. So, if a hawk meets a dove, the hawk always wins, receiving payoff b, while the dove receives nothing. If two doves meet, each is equally likely to win the resource, so the expected payoff is b/2. If two hawks meet, they fight over the resource; each expects to gain benefit b/2 and incur a cost of injury c/2, for an expected payoff of In this case, equation (30) becomeṡ
so we have
The equilibria of the system are
The condition (32) for the third equilibrium to lie in the interval of relevance 0 < x < 1 reduces to
If we let
then the linearization about z = 0 in the case of no delay (
Therefore, if (52) holds -that is, if the third equilibrium lies in the interval of relevance -the point z = 0 is stable for T = 0.
If there is a Hopf bifurcation, its critical frequency (42) is
and the necessary condition (43) for ω to be real and nonzero is c < 4b.
So, the condition for the point z = 0 to both lie in the interval of relevance and have a Hopf bifurcation is
It is useful to enforce condition (57) by defining a new parameter k, such that
Then in terms of b and k, the frequency ω is
The critical delay (44) is
and the amplitude of the limit cycle that is born in this bifurcation is given by equations (45)- (47):
where µ = T − T cr . The ratio P/Q can be written in terms of b and k as Note that in terms of b and k,
Therefore, we can divide each of these quantities by the appropriate power of b to obtain normalized versions that depend only on the parameter k. We see by plotting these results (Fig. 3 ) that P/Q > 0, so for the amplitude R to be real, µ must also be positive. Thus the Hopf bifurcation is supercritical, and the limit cycle is stable.
Finally, we compare the results of this perturbation method to those obtained by continuation in DDE-Biftool [7] for the particular case b = 1 and c = k = 3. (The latter method is outlined by Heckman, [8] .) See Fig. 4 . Note that the amplitude given by DDE-Biftool is the full width of the limit cycle, twice the 
CONCLUSION
We have investigated the dynamics of two-strategy systems of the formẋ
where f i = (A ·x i ) i is the (delayed) fitness of strategy i.
It is well known that periodic motions cannot occur in nondelayed two-strategy replicator systems, since the phase space is one-dimensional.
In this work, we have shown that, by introducing a delay in competition between strategies, it is possible to find two-strategy replicator systems which support periodic motions. In particular, we have demonstrated a range of parameters for which HawkDove systems with delayed competition exhibit stable limit cycles which are born in Hopf bifurcations.
This generalization of the replicator equation may be useful in modeling natural or social systems in which each group has a delayed estimate of the other groups' populations. This system may also be considered as a model for playing games by mail, with asynchronous score-updating for each group; or of competition between species with a fixed gestation time.
